



**STRATEGIC POSTURE ANNEX
TO THE
USAF STRATEGIC MASTER PLAN
MAY 2015**

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INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Strategic Posture Annex (SPA)

The Strategic Posture Annex is one of four annexes to the Strategic Master Plan (SMP) that translate the SMP's comprehensive goals and objectives into tangible actions and priorities that, in turn, may guide programming decisions. The Air Force's strategic posture is formulated by assessing force requirements against the strategy and ensuring adequate footprint and agreements are in place to support critical military operations.

Headquarters Air Force (HAF) will review this annex annually and measure progress against the objectives described in the SMP and within this document. We will continue to improve the objectives set forth in this document as tasks are completed and new concepts of global employment realized.

Intended Audience

This document is intended for HAF staff, Major Commands (MAJCOMs), Core Function Leads (CFLs), and the Air Force Forces (AFFOR) staffs. The SPA, as an embedded document in the Air Force's Strategy, Planning, and Programming Process (SP3), provides a vector to staffs preparing Strategic Planning Guidance and the Core Function Support Plans (CFSPs).

Definition and Scope

In its annual report to Congress, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) defines and scopes **posture as: "...forces, footprint, and agreements: Forces are U.S. military capabilities, equipment, and units assigned or rotationally deployed overseas. Footprint is our overseas network of infrastructure, facilities, and prepositioned equipment. Agreements are a series of treaties and access, transit, support, and status protection agreements and arrangements with Allies and partners that set the terms of U.S. military presence, as agreed with the host government."** As recently as 2014, OSD communications also describe global posture as the deliberate apportionment and global positioning of our forward-stationed and forward-deployed forces, the development of supporting missions and force, and the supporting security relationships and legal agreements necessary to facilitate rapid concentration of forces across transoceanic distances. This document also addresses our stateside footprint.

While the Air Force Strategic Basing Process (outlined in Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-503) provides an enterprise-wide framework for decisions on basing actions involving Air Force units and missions, the SPA can inform that process by translating strategic guidance into objectives and tasks. In today's global environment where threats continually evolve, the Air Force's ability to organize, train, and equip hinges on an effective and efficient global basing posture of installations and infrastructure.

Background

The Nation often depends on the Air Force's enduring characteristics of speed, range, flexibility, and precision to address a wide array of complex challenges across the globe. Looking forward, the Air Force must adapt our posture to remain a strategically agile force capable of operating in an increasingly contested environment against high-end threats.

As highlighted in the *Air Force Strategic Environment Assessment* (AFSEA) and numerous studies, the era in which the United States can project power globally virtually uncontested has ended. The proliferation of inexpensive technology enabled by globalization is greatly enhancing the ability of both state and non-state actors to challenge U.S. military power and strategic interests around the world across

the spectrum of conflict. This is certainly the case within the air, space, and cyberspace domains. For decades, U.S. air operations could usually expect: secure bases close to theater for logistics; effective low-observable capabilities; long force buildups in theater; adequate tanker support; effective beyond visual range air-to-air missiles; and secure and effective enablers in the space and cyberspace domains. Future trends suggest such guarantees will either disappear or at least be severely challenged.

Strategic Direction

The *2014 Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) directs that U.S. forces will be capable of simultaneously defending the homeland; conducting sustained, distributed counterterrorist operations; and in multiple regions, deterring aggression and assuring our allies through forward presence and engagement. U.S. forces will be capable of defeating a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased campaign, and denying the objectives of—or impose unacceptable costs on—another aggressor in another region.

In terms of **force presentation**, both Air Force and higher-level strategic guidance emphasize the need to posture for the most demanding scenario (operating in an increasingly contested environment), and to consider what the necessary permanent presence abroad is. However, we will not do so at the expense of all lower-end capabilities, and it is important we maintain sufficient critical forward enablers and infrastructure to effectively project combat power. As we operate in the future, the types of presence required for Air Force operations must evolve from the post-World War II and Cold War power projection basing constructs, including a large static presence, to one that is immediately responsive to a range of contingencies anytime, anywhere.

In accordance with the Department of Defense's (DoD) increased emphasis on full-spectrum operations and maintaining superior **power projection** capabilities, the SMP describes how the Air Force will ensure a full-spectrum capable, high-end focused force that will increasingly pursue a multi-domain approach to our five core missions. In the future, we will need to meet the Defense Strategy expressed in the *2014 QDR* with a smaller force. Maintaining our ability to project power may therefore require exploiting, extending, and gaining advantages in cyber and space control technologies as well as in unmanned systems, direct attack, and stand-off weapons.

Another critical aspect of posture is the Air Force's **resilience**. According to the *Guidance for Employment of the Force* (GEF), U.S. forces will improve the resilience of air, naval, ground, space, and missile-defense capabilities, in the face of large-scale, coordinated attacks. The Air Force has a responsibility to focus clearly on capabilities that will allow freedom of maneuver and decisive action in the highly-contested air, space, and cyberspace domains we anticipate. Vulnerability will be reduced through pursuit of a number of complementary active and passive measures that also allow sustainment of high-tempo operations. Resilient measures help provide the ability to operate and maintain front-line combat aircraft from austere bases while using only a small complement of logistical and support personnel and equipment.

National strategic guidance also consistently stresses the importance of **international partnerships**. Partnerships help support and realize U.S. strategic interests against challenges across the spectrum of conflict as well as enhance strategic posture. More specifically, improving international partnerships:

1. Can reduce the need to deploy U.S. forces abroad to address a crisis.
2. Improves the odds of gaining or sustaining U.S. access to, interoperability with, and/or cooperation with partner nations in a future crisis.
3. Enhances regional stability and security relevant to U.S. interests.
4. Helps the United States shape the global environment and increase its influence. For these reasons, DoD has directed the Services to develop, maintain, institutionalize, and provide forces

to conduct security cooperation in support of combatant commander's (CCDR) requirements.

In accordance with the strategic direction described above, the Air Force will:

- Focus on preparing and posturing for the most demanding scenario rather than extended stabilization operations (**Force Presentation**).
- Maintain the necessary permanent presence abroad including critical forward enablers and infrastructure in order to effectively project combat power (**Power Projection**).
- Increase emphasis on stand-off capabilities which maximize speed, range, and flexibility, while maintaining the ability to transition to effective, resilient presence in the battlespace (**Resilience**).
- Organize, train, and equip Airmen to effectively support CCDRs' security cooperation requirements (**International Partnerships**).

Assumptions

The following assumptions for this annex are adopted in part from the AFSEA, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020* (CCJO-JF2020), and the Air Force Strategy:

- Proliferation of long-range strike capabilities by other nations will impact our operational advantages, to include how we station forces and equipment overseas as well as protecting our homeland.
- Agile combat support will be tested and strained as we look to operate from more places than just main operating bases.
- Space and cyber will play a larger role in the projection of military power, making these domains more susceptible to physical and network attacks which may have a direct impact on our ability to perform an effective regional or global mission.
- Increased reliance on the Reserve Component will likely not lead to a detrimental decrease in the readiness of the Reserve Component.

Risk Assessment

The aggregate nature of the global strategic environment and corresponding posture related decisions entail considerable risk implications for successful execution of Air Force operations. At a minimum, these include the following:

- An increased focus on high-end operational capabilities could result in some atrophy of low-end conflict skills if not properly mitigated.
- Increased reliance on international partners for access and capabilities increases the risk for U.S. operations if such access and capabilities are not available, or are not interoperable with Air Force capabilities, when needed.
- The challenging fiscal environment will require the Air Force to take more risk in strategic posture decisions that include tradeoffs among present-day activities and future needs to ensure readiness.

Structure of the SPA

The SPA is organized in four sections (**Force Presentation, Power Projection, Resilience, and International Partnerships**) and provides direction leading to enhanced Air Force strategic posture. Each section includes: applicable definitions; a summary of the concepts, methods, capabilities, and resources necessary for the Air Force to enhance its strategic posture; and associated objectives and tasks.


For the purposes of this document, definitions of goals, objectives, and contributing objectives found in the SMP apply:

- **Objective Naming Convention:** Objectives are prefixed by the 3-digit code for the goal to which they primarily contribute, then numbered as an SMP objective, and then by annex, prefixed by **P** for those assigned in this SPA. See Figure 1 below. Tasks will include an additional lowercase letter (example: AG1.2.P1.a).
- **Table of Objectives and Tasks:** In the tables found at the end of each section in the SPA, SMP level objectives are typed in bold and are shaded. Annex-level objectives are listed below the SMP level objectives, with tasks (where applicable) listed below them and preceded by a bullet.

As a reminder, the base SMP Goals and Objectives designations are:

- AG - Agility
- IN - Inclusiveness
- DTR - Provide Effective 21st-Century Deterrence
- ISR - Maintain a Robust and Flexible Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) Capability
- FH - Ensure a Full-Spectrum Capable, High-End Focused Force
- MDA - Pursue a Multi-Domain Approach to our Five Core Missions
- GCT - Continue the Pursuit of Game-Changing Technologies

The figure below depicts the naming convention for SPA objectives.



(Figure 1)

Time frames:

- Near: 0-5 years, or within the current Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)
- Mid: 6-10 years
- Far: beyond 10 years

FORCE PRESENTATION

Definition

Force presentation refers to how the Air Force provides forces and support (equipment and resources) to meet global CCDR requirements. The Air Force supports global CCDR requirements through a combination of assigned, attached (rotational), and mobility forces that may be forward deployed, transient, or operating from home station.

Enhancing Strategic Posture

The SMP and SPA describe how we will prepare for the most demanding scenario rather than extended stabilization operations, in accordance with Air Force and higher level guidance. Without high-end air, space, and cyberspace capabilities, denied regions can pose significant obstacles to our operations. The SMP directs a focus on the capabilities that will allow freedom of maneuver and decisive action in such highly-contested battle spaces of the future. Our ability to provide those capabilities is underpinned by our Air Expeditionary Forces (AEF) and forward permanent-based forces. The AEF is the force generation construct used to manage the battle rhythm of forces to meet CCDR requirements while maintaining the highest possible level of overall readiness and providing forces and support on a relatively predictable basis. The newest AEF Teaming construct exemplifies the agility we seek.

As described in the GEF, our basing actions (analyzed in the Air Force Strategic Basing Process) should be informed by careful consideration of assurance, deterrence, and rapid response missions. The challenges we will face providing responsive Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power (GV-GR-GP) in the future strategic environment require the Air Force to prepare to operate in non-permissive environments. We should also seek more opportunities to work with joint and interagency partners to utilize their capabilities in permissive environments.

Additionally, given an environment of constrained resources, it is essential to delineate between infrastructure that directly enables the accomplishment of our core missions and that which indirectly supports these missions. We must always assure the availability of infrastructure most critical to readiness and operations.

The following discussion on force presentation-related concepts, methods, and capabilities that enhance our strategic posture includes AEF Teaming and Mission Infrastructure.

AEF Teaming

The Air Force Strategy and SMP state that while the Air Force will not posture for extended stabilization operations, we will prepare to respond to diverse regional commitments with ready and trained operational and support forces. The AEF construct is the methodology the Air Force uses to present such forces to the Global Force Management (GFM) process and serves as a baseline to inform planners on force presentation. Recently, the AEF construct was redesigned to enable more Airmen to deploy as a unit and to standardize dwell times across the Air Force as much as possible to present a consistent Air Force capacity to the warfighter. AEF Teaming allows wings to more effectively posture their forces to meet global mission requirements, as well as continue home station training. Implementation of this latest AEF model will facilitate better teamwork and unit performance during deployed operations with increased efficiency.

AEF Teaming is dependent on the Total Force. The operational Reserve requires a balanced approach using assured access via mobilization, with flexibility to capitalize on volunteerism in order to plan, commit, and sustain sourcing solutions during execution. While AEF Teaming makes it more feasible for the Air Reserve Component (ARC) to bring their essential contributions to bear, greater incorporation of Total Force considerations into Air Force planning will increase the flexibility of our force structure and optimize our operational responses. A holistic approach to planning might include exercises among the three components, changes to unit associations, and a synchronized planning and budget process. Before any such changes are made, appropriate review and analysis will be accomplished.

Mission Infrastructure

U.S. installations serve a number of purposes; the most critical one is supporting the Air Force mission with centralized locations for the training of capable forces, the development of capabilities, and providing reach-back for overseas operations. We must not confuse support infrastructure with mission infrastructure—MILCON for dormitories with space launch facilities, for example. As we prioritize funding, consolidate functions, demolish buildings and infrastructure, and build where necessary, the distinction between mission and support infrastructure is important.

The Air Force must also invest in our training infrastructure to perform our core missions. As we posture for the high-end fight, our training must include simulation of operating in a contested environment with degraded or limited systems. This is the foundation to a ready force and will help empower Airmen to conduct their mission effectively in the future. A holistic approach to training, including increased investment in Live-Virtual-Constructive (LVC) environments, is a key stone to such effort.

The Air Force may also continually improve stand-alone, high-end effects and new expeditionary concepts through use of science and technology (S&T) ideas tested on air-to-air ranges, air-to-ground ranges, airfields, and in cyberspace. Within the cyberspace domain, we will strive to establish a virtual cyberspace test range that leverages existing information technology (IT) labs and environments. We will expand virtual training for more career fields and use stateside networked scenarios to conduct deployment events in a timed sequence. Conducting training in a realistic, networked, time-dependent environment introduces Airmen to new approaches in systems employment.

The Air Force will ensure we have the “right installations,” which are developed through an installation master plan that supports resiliency, sustainability, and affordable installations. The results will be installations that are individually tailored for the mission(s) (e.g. CAF, MAF, ISR, C2, etc.) and the construct (e.g. hybrid base, city base, mission-only base, etc.) that best achieves Air Force objectives. It is also important that we have installations at the “right place” to support missions globally, which will require close scrutiny of near-, mid-, and far-term needs to ensure the optimum mix of U.S. and overseas garrison and expeditionary installations.

Objectives and Tasks

To enhance our strategic posture, we will accomplish the following objectives and tasks:

Table 1: SPA Objectives Supporting Force Presentation	Time Frame	OPR(s)	Connection to other Annexes
AG1.4 (Mid) Combine training across multiple mission sets, including integrated LVC venues and operator-in-the-loop Modeling and Simulation (M&S), to cultivate Airmen trained in agile and robust decision-making to devise multi-domain solutions to complex problems in uncertain, contested environments.			
AG1.4.P1: By FY20, expand the use of more capable simulators, integrating full spectrum operations into existing exercises and test/training ranges.	NEAR	AF/A3O	
AG1.4.P2: By FY23, deploy at least one LVC Regional Training Center which supports an integrated training event for Air Superiority, Global Precision Attack, ISR and Command and Control forces executing a combat scenario in the mid-term.	MID	AF/A3O	
AG1.4.P3: By FY23, use advanced modeling and simulation to evaluate force presentation options for all Integrated Security Constructs applying the concept of stand-off action transitioning to stand-in operations.	MID	AF/A3O	
AG1.4.P4: By FY20, research and test (in LVC environments) a new self-sustaining logistics model where forward units are less reliant on a large logistics tail with the goal of minimizing permanent presence abroad.	NEAR	AF/A4 OCRs: AF/A3O MAJCOMs	
AG1.4.P5: Research ways to improve stand-alone, high-end effects and new expeditionary concepts through experimentation and exploration of ideas tested in a variety of environments.	MID		S&T
IN1.2 (Near) Incorporate Total Force considerations wherever possible in order to increase the flexibility of our force structure and optimize our operational responses. Focus on identifying appropriate force mix options, eliminating structural and legal barriers, and increasing opportunities for component integration.			
IN1.2.P1: Demonstrate an integrated and holistic approach to address force presentation requirements through a near-spontaneous exercise that includes Active, Guard, and Reserve assets and personnel by FY20.	NEAR	AF/A8XF	
IN1.2.P2: By FY19, analyze existing unit associations to ensure appropriate balance, with emphasis on balancing appropriate readiness for critical capabilities. Consider options which potentially reduce footprint both stateside and overseas while maintaining resources and manpower inventory necessary to accomplish required missions.	NEAR	AF/REX OCR: AF/A4	
IN1.2.P3: By FY18, review and evaluate the current planning baseline in each Core Function Lead's Total Force Enterprise to further integrate planning and budgeting considerations. This effort should include the following at a minimum: numbers of and types of associations, unit equipped squadrons, and Total Force manpower.	NEAR	CFLs OCRs: AF/REX, ANG/A8	
IN1.2.P4: By FY17, devise and implement a plan for integrating Total Force-Continuum (TF-C) High Velocity Analysis recommendations into applicable Core Function Support Plans.	NEAR	AF/A8X AF/REX	

Table 1: SPA Objectives Supporting Force Presentation

	Time Frame	OPR(s)	Connection to other Annexes
FH1.5 (Near) Reduce emphasis on tactical tasks in permissive environments where other Services have sufficient organic capacity (for example tactical ISR, fire support, and intra-theater mobility).			
FH1.5.P1: By FY20, examine the Air Force portfolio for an increase in opportunities to utilize joint and interagency capabilities useful in permissive environments through evaluation of existing capacity and socialization of any planned changes to locations and missions.	NEAR	AF/A4	
MDA.2 (Near) Reappraise existing compartmentalization practices and eliminate institutional barriers to empower Airmen and organizations to employ multi-domain approaches.			
MDA.2.P1: By FY18, review and identify existing gaps in facilities and networks requirements necessary for increased testing and execution of new and/or alternative multi-domain approaches to CCDR requirements. Develop a plan to address these gaps by consolidating existing test labs and environments.	NEAR	AF/A3	

POWER PROJECTION

Definition

Power projection includes the application of offensive military force against an enemy at a time, place, and duration of our nation's choosing (Air Force Doctrine).

Enhancing Strategic Posture

The Air Force will increase flexibility for power projection by examining ways to make our posture more efficient, maximizing existing and future capabilities and resources, and pursuing new presence paradigms that retain sufficient footprint to complete comprehensive defense of assets.

The character of power projection in a given circumstance will reflect the objective: permissive, hostile/contested, or uncertain. To gain and maintain operational access and advantage across the domains in a contested environment, we must have the full spectrum of lethal, non-lethal, conventional, and special capabilities available. Power projection capabilities include ready and trained forces, the ability to move rapidly from place to place, and our forces' ability to operate anywhere around the world.

Our basing decisions and priorities combine to form an integrated enterprise basing construct that provides the Air Force with the agility and flexibility needed to rapidly respond across the full range of military operations in multiple locations. Such power projection depends in large part on the installations, runways, buildings, utilities, and other critical infrastructure. Our Air Force Bases (AFB) and supporting infrastructure enable space and cyberspace operations and support strategic airlift. Additionally, AFBs allow us to hold global targets at risk as our launching points for bomber and missile forces, and to launch and recover fighters. Our bases also serve as platforms to collect, process, and disseminate intelligence through a variety of assets. In short, we cannot "fly, fight, and win in air, space, and cyberspace" without effective, sustainable installations. We will evaluate the most effective installations and infrastructure to provide training capability development and reach-back for overseas operations within the fiscally constrained environment. The Air Force shall provide input to CCDRs as they identify opportunities to develop agreements, consider joint and combined footprint enhancements, and alter exercise and training events.

As we posture our forces to support steady-state homeland defense and deterrence missions, we understand the ability to respond to no-notice aggression by key adversaries is also a critical element. Deterring future adversaries such as non-state actors and nuclear-armed regional adversaries will be different than deterring traditional state actors.

In addition, growing instability across the world is widely expected to require the U.S. military to increase special operations, urban operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) missions, and irregular warfare around the world. Reliable infrastructure and access are key elements to the Air Force's ability to meet such DoD strategic priorities. In addition, a soft power element of power projection is communicated when we use our resources to support international engagements such as humanitarian crisis response.

The following power projection-related concepts, methods, and capabilities that enhance our strategic posture include discussion of a new CONUS basing model, OCONUS basing, and other considerations.

Toward a New CONUS Basing Model

A critical element of force presentation and power projection is how the Air Force uses current basing and logistics constructs and an awareness of areas needing improvement. As we change our way of delivering support services, our footprint will be adjusted to match. To preserve expeditionary capabilities and in support of readiness, we will continue to develop an affordable, deliberate approach to installations and provide a framework driven primarily by strategic direction rather than current fiscally driven exigencies. AF/A4 and Air Force Materiel Command remain focused on creating the 2023 Installation Model based on analysis and the goal of providing enterprise standards with “local execution.”

As with several decades of infrastructure reductions overseas, DoD desires to reduce excess infrastructure stateside. However, Congressional support is needed to allow the military more options to improve resource management. Meanwhile, the Air Force will continue to develop new options, both stateside and overseas, to integrate Active and Reserve Component activities as a means to enhance readiness and potentially reduce our footprint. To achieve this, enhanced consideration of and dialogue with Air Reserve Component headquarters level planners is paramount.

OCONUS Basing

Global power projection is best facilitated by enduring installations often hosted by our allied and coalition partners. However, we are also called upon to establish U.S.-led contingency installations in support of the *National Military Strategy*. Host nation (HN)-provided installations offer strategic opportunities to strengthen relationships, air route access, and power projection. Although Air Force units are usually tenants on contingency bases, the Air Force maintains the capability and capacity to plan, open, establish, operate, sustain, protect, and close contingency bases and will ensure these processes are done in the most effective and efficient method. Formal support agreements with the HN are essential for all overseas installations and drives local community considerations similar to U.S.-based installations. We will ensure long-range planning for contingency basing is comprehensive to ensure fiscal and physical resources are available to support expeditionary mission operations.

Unlike expeditionary ground forces, the Air Force cannot operate on a rotational basis alone. Global and theater support demands a reliable network for air, cyber, and space activities and a strong logistics backbone for support. Therefore, we will review stateside and overseas facility requirements and seek out coalition and industry partnerships where excess infrastructure cannot be readily divested, but could be potentially used for shared-use agreements. This requires a delicate balance between efficiency and ensuring the ability to project power.

While continuing to develop methods to support power projection via reach back and long-range global strike operations, our overseas footprint is vital. In early phases we will develop priorities to ensure resiliency and continuity of operations at forward locations. As will be discussed in the Resilience section of this document, we may also seek out additional ways to remodel or repurpose facilities to include items such as base hangars and underground refueling hydrants, thereby reducing the strain for MILCON dollars.

Other Considerations

With adversaries challenging our ability to access and guarantee freedom of movement within critical areas of operation, it is important for the Air Force to pursue a variety of options to enable power projection. For the Air Force’s Global Precision Attack (GPA) core function in particular, the requirement to execute at strategic ranges in such a highly contested environment is the most challenging setting against which the GPA CFL will measure risk in the future. Due to the priority of investments in the

United States’ ability to operate in such an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environment, investments in related facilities and infrastructure are necessary.

As the Nation evolves its deterrence capabilities across the whole of government to meet the diverse challenges of the global security environment, the Air Force will continue to apply the full range of nuclear, conventional, and cooperative means to deter actions by state and non-state adversaries that threaten our interests abroad.

The United States also projects power to provide stability when countries or regions need it most. As the Air Force considers preparing for HA/DR, evaluation of methods to support lead federal agencies in mitigating the likelihood and negative effects of man-made or natural disasters is essential. As directed in the GEF, suggested measures should focus on building our partner nations’ capacity to prepare for, mitigate, or respond to humanitarian disasters.

Additionally, the Air Reserve Component enhances overall strategic agility through operational capabilities, surge capacity, and strategic depth enabling power projection. The Air Force cannot meet its operational requirements without the continued, planned use of the Reserve Component. The Air Force must plan and budget for the assured access of the Reserve Component while ensuring readiness to support future contingencies.

Objectives and Tasks

To enhance our strategic posture, we will accomplish the following objectives and tasks:

Table 2: SPA Objectives and Tasks Supporting Power Projection	Time Frame	OPR(s)	Connection to other Annexes
AG1.4 (Mid) Combine training across multiple mission sets, including integrated LVC venues and operator-in-the-loop M&S, to cultivate Airmen trained in agile and robust decision-making to devise multi-domain solutions to complex problems in uncertain, contested environments.			
AG1.4.P6: By FY25, demonstrate multi-domain Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) to synchronize, conduct, and sustain logistics in distributed operations and contested or contaminated environments for air, space, and cyberspace operations using operator-in-the-loop modeling and simulation.	MID	AF/A4	
AG1.5 (Far) Preserve full-spectrum warfighting, expeditionary, and combat support capabilities by retaining expert Airmen with experience in recent conflicts, codifying lessons learned, and further integrating joint training (including LVC) to offset reduced resourcing for low-intensity operations.			
AG1.5.P1: By FY25, Codify and distribute appropriately expeditionary and combat support capabilities lessons learned garnered during recent operations in order to better support accomplishment of CCDR requirements.	FAR	AFMC A8/9	
IN3.3 (Mid) Deepen our relationships with the joint team, intelligence community, diplomatic institutions, developmental agencies, local governments, businesses, communities, and international partners through sustained dialogue, increased training and exchange, aviation security cooperation, and iterative enterprises to codify shared doctrine, tactics, and capabilities.			

Table 2: SPA Objectives and Tasks Supporting Power Projection

	Time Frame	OPR(s)	Connection to other Annexes
IN3.3.P1: By FY25, improve interoperability with and strengthen capabilities of partner nations to ensure access to installations, services, and support for mutually beneficial purposes (e.g. humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, exercise related construction and host nation training).	MID	SAF/IA, OCR: AF/A4	
IN3.3.P2: By FY25, improve incorporation of the ideas, views, and concerns of HAF agencies with equity in the global posture community in order to execute a coherent and cohesive Air Force message regarding global power projection with Service, joint, interagency, and Congressional partners.	MID	HAF/CX, OCRs: AF/A5S SAF/PA SAF/LL	
DTR.1 (Mid) Maintain a credible and robust strategic deterrence posture through sustainment, modernization, recapitalization, readiness, and protection of the Air Force’s nuclear mission and supporting infrastructure.			
DTR.1.P1: By FY25, bolster deterrence posture by implementing GEF-directed positioning of assets, and identify efficient, agile logistics and infrastructure methods to sustain these assets through all spectrums of conflict.	MID	AF/A10, OCRs: AF/A4	
DTR.2 (Far) Develop, test, and implement additional non-nuclear capabilities that deter a wide range of adversaries, including non-state actors, and assure allies and partners. Consider low-cost measures that generate high-cost adversary responses.			
DTR.2.P1: Increase deployment and overseas positioning of decoys and other deceptive options to alter adversary calculations.	MID	CFLs	
ISR.4 (Far) Enhance capabilities to holistically detect, monitor, analyze, and attribute threats (kinetic or non-kinetic), adversaries, and their support networks, and improve target systems analysis in order to determine the best way to act on this intelligence.			
ISR.4.P1: By FY25, build a cost-efficient force presentation option that provides a “rapid-reaction,” multi-domain ISR effect against a state or non-state actor. This option will likely include facilities and agreements considerations or plans.	FAR	AFSPC A5X ACC A5/8/9 AF/A6CIO	CA
FH1.1 (Near) Ensure the ability to gain and maintain the required degree of control of the air to prevent effective enemy interference with friendly operations.			
FH1.1.P1: By FY19, maintain a ready, resilient, and operationally flexible force posture that ensures forward access as required.	NEAR	AF/A4 OCR: AF/A3	HCA
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FH1.1.P1.a: Review existing agreements to identify potential new forward locations for additional basing within strategic proximity of potential high-end operations areas. To the maximum extent possible, bases should be located in multiple nations. 	NEAR	MAJCOMs, OCRs: AF/A3O AF/A8XX SAF/IE AF/JA	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FH1.1.P1.b: Build an Agile Combat Support framework and demonstrate its ability to sustain periodic rotational presence in selected forward locations. 	NEAR	AFMC A8/9	

Table 2: SPA Objectives and Tasks Supporting Power Projection

	Time Frame	OPR(s)	Connection to other Annexes
FH1.1.P2: By FY20, demonstrate a joint, interoperable Agile Combat Support (ACS) Common Operating Picture that provides accurate and timely information during a simulated cyber-contested environment.	NEAR	AF/A4, OCR: AFMC/A8/9	
FH2.2 (Mid) Increase emphasis on stand-off capabilities that maximize speed, range, and flexibility, while maintaining the ability to transition to effective, resilient presence in the battlespace.			
FH2.2.P1: By FY25, maintain and/or improve availability and capabilities of U.S. and overseas training ranges to accommodate more integrated kinetic and non-kinetic missions.	MID	AF/A3OJ	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FH2.2.P1.a: Integrate the Global Force Management (GFM) process elements into force allocation considerations, to more efficiently assign required forces to the theater. 	NEAR	AF/A3OO	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FH2.2.P1.b: By FY19, evaluate existing agreements to ensure those necessary for forward operational flexibility are in place, and by FY25 address any shortfalls. (ex. Revamped Australia Bomber agreement) 	NEAR	SAF/IA OCRs: AF/A3, AF/A5/8, AF/JA	
FH2.2.P2: By FY25, increase shared joint/partner/coalition investment in infrastructure where gaps create risk to power projection (ex. MILCON investments in hardening, shelters, and underground fuel facilities).	MID	SAF/IE, OCRs: SAF/IA AF/A4	CA
FH2.2.P3: By FY23, demonstrate the processes, infrastructure and IT required to support unique stand-off capabilities and project power.	MID	MAJCOMS	
FH2.2.P4: Identify and annually evaluate cold-bases which could be available to support stand-off operations near contested battlespace.	NEAR	C-MAJCOMs AFFOR	
FH2.2.P5: Exercise basing and posture transitions from stand-off to stand-in as part of a major Air Force exercise to include infrastructure and Information Technology.	MID	C-MAJCOMs AFFOR	
Contributing Objective:			
FH1.1.P1: By FY19, maintain a ready, resilient, and operationally flexible force posture that ensures forward access as required.			
FH2.5 (Far) Ensure rapid, robust global mobility by developing and maintaining smart and adaptive global and theater distribution networks to ensure the most efficient movement and positioning of materials, and by leveraging advanced design and manufacturing.			
FH2.5.P1: By FY30, institute a smart and adaptive theater distribution network for at least one specific platform (i.e. F-16).	FAR	AF/A4, OCRs: AMC, AF/A3OM	
FH2.5.P2: By FY25, increase the use of just-in-time logistics support from industry partners which can be activated based on demand.	MID	AF/A4, OCRs: AMC, SAF/AQ	

Table 2: SPA Objectives and Tasks Supporting Power Projection

	Time Frame	OPR(s)	Connection to other Annexes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FH2.5.P2.a: Equip or stage logistics centers to support operations against a high-end adversary. 	MID	AF/A4, OCRs: AMC, SAF/AQ	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FH2.5.P2.b: Identify logistics shortfalls associated with a specific Integrated Security Construct and implement end-to-end supply chain changes to reduce the risk. 	MID	AF/A4, OCRs: AMC, SAF/AQ	
FH2.7 (Mid) Provide resilient installations, infrastructure, and combat support capabilities that enable the Air Force to project power rapidly, effectively, and efficiently.			
FH2.7.P1: Ensure the “right installations” (force structure and missions) are in the “right place” to support Air Force missions globally.	MID	SAF/IEI OCR: AF/A4	
FH2.7.P2: By FY25, optimize installations by providing effective infrastructure and services to support GV-GR-GP missions in the most efficient manner possible (e.g. centralized locations for the training; provide reach-back for overseas operations; increase coalition/allied/industry shared-use agreements; remodel/repurpose facilities to reduce costs; etc.).	MID	AF/A4C OCR: SAF/IE	
FH2.7.P3: By FY25, improve the acquisition and sustainment of Air Force logistics systems through partnership with industry and commercial partners to decrease the long-term costs, decrease acquisition and sustainment risks, and shorten the acquisitions timeline.	MID	SAF/AQ, OCR: AF/A4	
Contributing Objective: IN3.3.P1: By FY25, improve interoperability with and strengthen capabilities of partner nations to ensure access to installations, services, and support for mutually beneficial purposes (e.g. humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, exercise related construction and host nation training).			

RESILIENCE

Definition

Resilience is the capacity of a force to withstand attack, adapt, and generate sufficient combat power to achieve campaign objectives in the face of continued enemy action. In the context of strategic posture, **resilience** is defined as the ability of Air Force units to continue to conduct air, space, and cyberspace operations despite disruption whether natural or man-made, inadvertent, or deliberate.

Enhancing Strategic Posture

As noted in the AFSEA, the era in which the United States can project global military power virtually uncontested has ended. The proliferation of inexpensive technology enabled by globalization is greatly enhancing the ability of both state and non-state actors to challenge our military power, international support, domestic resolve, economy, and homeland security. Space and cyberspace are also becoming increasingly important and contested. The pervasiveness and advancement of computer technology and reliance on the internet and usable networks are creating means and opportunity for computer attack by numerous state and non-state aggressors. Additionally, the domain of space remains integral to such military capabilities as communications, surveillance, and positioning.

The Air Force Strategy directs us to pursue effective resilience measures with stronger Command and Control (C2) capabilities including interoperable, secure, and reliable communications. Projecting power in high-end contested environments will require improvement of our existing ISR systems and processes to ensure sustained and secure operations. Such environments will likely present challenges for our information systems and necessitate plans for mitigation. A sustainable, diversified basing network improves resiliency by minimizing the risk of access denial by adversaries or uncertain host nation support. The Air Force Strategy also directs us to find ways to minimize the force protection bill while lowering risk to critical systems.

To enhance the Air Force's resilient posture, resources must be balanced between a number of passive measures (such as alternative basing, hardening C2 infrastructure, and partnering with allies) and active measures (such as investment in air and space superiority, supporting the Army in air and missile defense, developing new concepts, and potentially increasing Air Force base defense capabilities) for greater resiliency. These resources are especially needed for equipping bases existing within high-end threat envelopes, and may be available through cost-sharing with our sister services and coalition partners in some locations. Defending forward bases may include organic Air Force kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities to destroy or degrade air and missile threats. In the future, operating from bases in the United States and overseas will likely also be held at some level of risk. The effects of passive and active measures will posture the Air Force to be resilient across multiple domains, increasing the Air Force's strategic agility by improving flexibility and reducing our vulnerability to emerging threats.

As we work to reduce the human and physical footprint of forward-stationed forces while retaining a forward presence as needed to project power, we will minimize vulnerability and thus enhance resilience. Footprint reductions will be determined to meet the minimum level required for sustained operations and in coordination with new agile employment and basing concepts. Such reductions can be made in part by leveraging advances in manufacturing, energy efficiency, and renewable resources. Additionally, the Air Force will leverage partner nation agile combat support capabilities on lower-risk tasks to further reduce U.S. costs. An integral aspect of reducing our footprint is also developing a more expeditionary capable and self-sustaining mindset among Airmen.

As noted in the International Partnerships section of this document, improved resilience is also possible

through strengthened partner relations. By partnering with allies, we can attain sufficient dispersion for cross-domain operations, thereby increasing our assured access to potential basing options and denying our adversaries the same. In addition, effective public affairs outreach and mil-to-mil engagements enable us to remain engaged and stem the growth of adversarial ideologies as we build relationships with and support from foreign audiences.

Posture resilience can also be enhanced by leveraging information operations, which typically employ non-kinetic and small-footprint capabilities. The information environment is growing as the adversarial domain of choice to execute their operations and increase their influence. Expanded Air Force operations in the information environment are necessary to counter these challenges as well as meet U.S. and allied objectives without expending the manpower or incurring the cost of deploying a robust force.

Considering that an adversary with robust Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities can contest our access and movement to the theater, we must consider creative basing alternatives. The Air Force has within its purview the ability to examine basing alternatives for improved viability and risk mitigation in the context of: beddown planning; ACS resiliency engineering; force apportionment; and survivable defense. Through the Air Force Strategic Basing Structure (AFSBS), we can influence such decisions. Additional concepts for improving expeditionary basing in denied areas include force phasing, laydown, and operational tasking of Air Force forces by partnering across service, governmental, and national lines.

Objectives and Tasks

To enhance our strategic posture, we will accomplish the following objectives and tasks:

Table 3: SPA Objectives and Tasks Supporting Resilience	Time Frame	OPR(s)	Connection to other Annexes
DTR.2 (Far) Develop, test, and implement additional non-nuclear capabilities that deter a wide range of adversaries, including non-state actors, and assure allies and partners. Consider low-cost measures that generate high-cost adversary responses.			
DTR.2.P2: In consultation with CCDRs, assess the capability and capacity of partner nation airfield infrastructure and develop a capability to build partner capacity in ACS capabilities to support a base dispersal plan by FY20. (Tied to objective IN3.3.P3)	NEAR	AF/A4, OCRs: AF/A5, MAJCOMs	
DTR.2.P3: Effectively integrate communication efforts with OSD and Combatant Command (CCMD) communication plans to synchronize messages with partner nations and allies in support of regional and global activities by FY20.	NEAR	SAF/PA	
ISR.1 (Mid) Rebalance resilient ISR sensors, systems and processes toward operations in high-end contested environments, and focus on moderately priced systems, to include commercial technology, for permissive environments.			
ISR.1.P1: By FY25, improve resilience of existing systems and processes through interoperable, secure, and reliable communication systems worldwide.	MID	AF/A2	
ISR.1.P2: By FY23, implement staging of spares for ISR sensors based upon regional threat analysis.	MID	ACC/A4	
ISR.1.P3: By FY20, determine maintenance and logistics breakpoints for ISR assets as a means to generate partially mission capable sorties.	NEAR	AF/A4, AF/A2	

Table 3: SPA Objectives and Tasks Supporting Resilience

	Time Frame	OPR(s)	Connection to other Annexes
FH1.1 (Near) Ensure the ability to gain and maintain the required degree of control of the air to prevent effective enemy interference with friendly operations.			
FH1.1.P3: By FY20, increase resilience of basing options working through OSD’s Global Posture process for diversification and creative basing alternatives to the AFSBS, in order to minimize the risk of access denial by an adversary or uncertain host nation political support in certain contingencies.	NEAR	AF/A8XX OCRs: SAF/IEIB AF/A4L AF/A4C	
FH1.4 (Mid) Enhance abilities to degrade or deny situational awareness and targeting ability to an advanced enemy.			
FH1.4.P1: By FY25, increase survivability of CCDR information systems (in accordance with Air Force role) to provide mission assurance and network redundancy, despite malicious cyber activity or attacks.	MID	SAF/CIO A6	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FH1.4.P1.a: By FY25, field integrated, scalable affordable IT solutions that are interoperable with joint IT, providing accurate and timely information, support a Logistics Common Operating Picture, and are capable of operating within a contested cyber environment. 	MID	SAF/CIO A6, OCR: AF/A4	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FH1.4.P1.b: By FY22, identify, assess, and develop risk mitigation for infrastructure and IT supply chain vulnerabilities. 	MID	SAF/CIO A6 AFMC A8/9, OCR: AF/A4	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FH1.4.P1.c: By FY18, exercise communication-isolated operations to increase autonomy and continuity of operations possible during high-end conflict. 	NEAR	SAF/CIO A6	
FH1.4.P2: Refocus efforts to create a robust and resilient logistics distribution network in support of high-tempo dispersal operations.	MID	AF/A4, OCR: AMC	
FH1.4.P3: By FY25, develop and execute a plan to deny observation and targeting of main and dispersed operating bases, to include deploying and employing Camouflage-Concealment-Deception (CCD) capabilities to bases threatened by high-end adversaries.	MID	AF/A30, OCR: AF/A4CS	CA S&T
FH1.4.P4: By FY19, refocus a major Air Force exercise to include base and mission recovery after direct, surprise attack.	NEAR	AF/A30 OCR: AF/A4	
FH1.4.P5: By FY23, assess the need, utility, and feasibility of options to field organic terminal defense capabilities.	MID	AF/A5R ACS CFL	
FH1.4.P6: By FY25, Establish an Information Operations career force and develop the training to equip them with the knowledge, skills, and experience to plan and conduct forward deployed and remote operations to influence and deny adversary situational awareness, as well as shape ally and partner nation support.	MID	AF/A30Y OCRs: SAF/MR, AF/A1D	
FH1.5 (Near) Reduce emphasis on tactical tasks in permissive environments where other Services have sufficient organic capacity (for example tactical ISR, fire support, and intra-theater mobility).			

Table 3: SPA Objectives and Tasks Supporting Resilience

	Time Frame	OPR(s)	Connection to other Annexes
FH1.5.P2: By FY19, test mitigation plans to operate in cyber contested environments that degrade or compromise Logistics IT systems, including active and realistic logistics participation in wargames, simulations, and exercises.	NEAR	SAF/CIO A6, OCRs: MAJCOMs, AF/A4	
FH2.2 (Mid) Increase emphasis on stand-off capabilities which maximize speed, range, and flexibility, while maintaining the ability to transition to effective, resilient presence in the battlespace.			
FH2.2.P6: By FY25, equip bases within high-end threat envelopes with enhanced active and passive protective measures. Where possible, cost-share with sister services and coalition partners.	MID	AF/A4C	
FH2.7 (Mid) Provide resilient installations, infrastructure, and combat support capabilities that enable the Air Force to project power rapidly, effectively, and efficiently.			
FH2.7.P4: Elevate the importance of logistics and sustainment planning into system acquisitions to decrease long-term costs and promote efficiency.	MID	SAF/AQ, OCR: AF/A4	CA

INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS

Definitions

Within the scope of this document, the term **international partnerships** refers to U.S. military-to-military relationships with other nations.

One of the primary tools the U.S. Government uses to sustain and improve its military-to-military partnerships with other nations is **Security Sector Assistance (SSA)**, established and implemented by Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-23, "Security Sector Assistance." PPD-23 defines SSA as "the policies, programs, and activities the United States uses to: engage with foreign partners and help shape their policies and actions in the security sector; help foreign partners build and sustain the capacity and effectiveness of legitimate institutions to provide security, safety, and justice for their people; and enable foreign partners to contribute to efforts that address common security challenges."

DoD's contribution to SSA is **security cooperation (SC)**, which DoD defines as "all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation." SC includes all security assistance, foreign internal defense, international armaments cooperation, and security force assistance (SFA) conducted by the DoD. SC resource investments are driven by country objectives that articulate desired partner roles in one of three categories: political action, access, and military activity, which all provide context for strategy.

Enhancing Strategic Posture

The Air Force Strategy reflects the importance of improving international partnerships in enhancing our strategic posture:

"We are a global Air Force with global responsibilities. Whether maintaining long-proven alliances and coalitions or seeking new partnerships, the Air Force must increasingly look internationally to effectively deliver Global Vigilance-Global Reach-Global Power. Partnerships enhance deterrence, build regional stability, offset costs, increase capability and capacity, and ensure access. Indeed, the most likely and most demanding scenarios involve the Air Force working in concert with, or leading, coalition Airmen. We must accordingly invigorate our commitment to international like-minded Airmen who can build and sustain global partnerships. The return on purposed, strategic partnering is a growing, more capable team of air forces better empowered to provide for their own security, and agile enough to integrate into an effective fighting force."

The most direct way the Air Force supports the Nation's SC effort to improve international partnerships as envisioned in the Air Force Strategy is to effectively organize, train, and equip Airmen to execute SC. However, recent analysis concluded that we need to make changes within our general purpose forces to achieve this.

First, we must shift our mindset from providing "just-in-time" or inadequately trained Airmen to support SC on a largely ad hoc basis to providing adequately trained Airmen using consistent, institutionalized processes and funding mechanisms.

Second, Air Force efforts to organize, train, and equip to support CCDR SC requirements also must include the ability develop partner nations’ abilities to help achieve Air Force Strategy “strategic vectors” when tasked. For example, Airmen should be able to enable certain partner nations to help the Air Force achieve effective 21st century deterrence; maintain a robust and flexible global ISR capability; ensure a full-spectrum capable, high-end focused force; and pursue a multi-domain approach to the Air Force’s five core missions.

Third, the Air Force needs to organize, train, and equip to effectively conduct SC with the full spectrum of international partners ranging from advanced to emerging air forces.

The Air Force needs a comprehensive SC Flight Plan to guide and coordinate these efforts across the Service to support CCDR SC requirements as effectively and efficiently as possible given limited resources as well as to help realize the Air Force Strategy. This SC Flight Plan should ensure the Air Force’s SC efforts are more long-term, targeted, strategic, and more closely tied to U.S. strategic interests – especially related to the air, space, and cyberspace domains.

Objectives and Tasks

To address these challenges and enhance our strategic posture by improving international partnerships, we will accomplish the following objectives and tasks:

Table 4: SPA Objectives and Tasks Supporting International Partnerships	Time Frame	OPR(s)	Connection to other Annexes
IN2.3 (Mid) Orient and educate the force to the idea that a blend of varied perspectives, cognitive approaches, and critical thought is a vital combat capability and integrate it into all aspects of our operations. Focus on eliminating institutional barriers to creating and retaining a diverse team.			
IN2.3.P1: By FY25, develop a “partnering culture” among Airmen across the Total Force to build and maintain language, region, and culture expertise; demonstrate air advising skills; and think strategically about how peacetime operations can shape geopolitical relationships to provide advantage for U.S. foreign policy.	MID	AF/A1D	HCA
IN3.3 (Mid) Deepen our relationships with the joint team, intelligence community, diplomatic institutions, developmental agencies, local governments, businesses, communities, and international partners through sustained dialogue, increased training and exchange, aviation security cooperation, and iterative enterprises to codify shared doctrine, tactics, and capabilities.			
IN3.3.P3: By FY20, organize, train, and equip Airmen to conduct security cooperation in a strategic and prioritized manner to shape the global air, space, and cyberspace domains in line with the Nation’s strategic interests. (Tied to numerous other objectives related to international partnerships)	NEAR	SAF/IA, AF/A3OMQ	HCA
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IN3.3.P3.a: Execute the applicable recommendations from recent studies and follow-on analyses tasked by senior leadership to enable the Air Force to effectively meet the CCDR’s SC needs. Such studies may include the FY16 Air Advisor Demand Study. 	NEAR	AF/A3OMQ	

Table 4: SPA Objectives and Tasks Supporting International Partnerships	Time Frame	OPR(s)	Connection to other Annexes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IN3.3.P3.b: By FY16, publish and implement a USAF Security Cooperation Flight Plan to guide Air Force SC efforts to effectively and comprehensively support all aspects of the SMP's guidance to improve international partnerships. 	NEAR	SAF/IAGS	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IN3.3.P3.c: By FY18, build a trained and adequately manned planning capacity to effectively support CCDRs as they conceive, plan, and conduct SC activities associated with the air, space, and cyberspace domains. 	NEAR	A3O-CS	HCA
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IN3.3.P3.d: By FY18, develop and implement a method to continually assess the effectiveness of Air Force SC efforts to meet the Nation's SC ends associated with the air, space, and cyberspace domains and recommend adjustments to Air Force SC ways and means based on those assessments. 	NEAR	SAF/IA OCRs: AF/A9, AF/ A3OMQ	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IN3.3.P3.e: By FY20, ensure International Affairs Specialists are fully trained with the international skills necessary, and receive necessary training for sustainment, to effectively meet Joint, Interagency, and Air Force international outreach requirements. 	NEAR	SAF/ IA	HCA
<p>IN3.3.P4: By FY25, leverage external partner opportunities to provide installations, services, and support in order to obtain assured access in a mutual and cost-effective manner. (Tied to objective FH2.5.P3)</p>	MID	AF/A4	
<p>IN3.3.P5: By FY19, create a permanent presence of international capabilities at the Air Warfare Center's training ranges with emphasis on preserving full-spectrum responses.</p>	NEAR	AFCENT	
DTR.2 (Far) Develop, test, and implement additional non-nuclear capabilities that deter a wide range of adversaries, including non-state actors, and assure allies & partners. Consider low-cost measures that generate high-cost adversary responses.			
<p>DTR.2.P4: Improve how the Air Force organizes, trains, and equips to support aviation-related SC efforts that strengthen global deterrence and assure allies and partners. (Tied to objectives IN3.3.P3 and ISR.6)</p>	NEAR	AF/ A3OMQ OCR: AF/A1D	
<p>DTR.2.P5: By FY23, establish a creative, effective, and affordable way to enhance the Air Force's ability to develop emerging partner nation air forces that use light aircraft (as articulated in the 2013 USAF Irregular Warfare Strategy).</p>	MID	AF/ A3OMQ OCR: SAF/IAG	
ISR.1 (Mid) Rebalance resilient ISR sensors, systems and processes toward operations in high-end contested environments, and focus on moderately priced systems, to include commercial technology, for permissive environments.			
<p>ISR.1.P4: Maintain an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable communication and ISR infrastructure with trusted allies.</p>	NEAR	AF/A2DS	

Table 4: SPA Objectives and Tasks Supporting International Partnerships	Time Frame	OPR(s)	Connection to other Annexes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ISR.1.P4.a: By FY20, expand use of partner space and cyberspace capabilities across the spectrum of operations. Focus on enhancing resiliency of on-orbit constellations and space situational awareness and ways to mitigate or decrease U.S. and partner vulnerabilities. 	NEAR	AF/A2DS	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ISR.1.P4.b: By FY20, in support of CCDRs and in consultation with functional components, develop forces capable of advising emerging partner nations on lower-cost permissive ISR capabilities in order to reduce U.S. requirements and further deter non-state actors. (Tied to objective IN3.3.P3) 	NEAR	PACAF/A2, USAFE-AFAFRICA/A2, AF/A2, ACC/A2	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ISR.1.P4.c: By FY25, increase the availability of ISR systems with partner nations with the intent to exchange data for expanded capacity. 	MID	AF/A2	
ISR.4 (Far) Enhance capabilities to holistically detect, monitor, analyze, and attribute threats (kinetic or non-kinetic), adversaries, and their support networks, and improve target systems analysis in order to determine the best way to act on this intelligence.			
ISR.4.P2: By FY20, conduct airborne ISR exercises with international partners to increase regional ISR cooperation.	NEAR	AF/A3O	
ISR.5 (Near) Improve policies, processes, and organizations for obtaining, sharing, and releasing pertinent multi-domain intelligence with joint, interagency, and international partners.			
ISR.5.P1: By FY20, enable states to counter internal threats by developing a capability to advise, train, and equip partner nations with ISR capabilities to expand U.S. access to sensors, data, and regional expertise. (Tied to objective IN3.3.P3)	NEAR	AF/A3OMQ OCR: AF/A2DS	
ISR.5.P2: Develop processes to improve partner nation planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination (PCPAD) capabilities to share ISR tasks and derived information to support bilateral and coalition operations	NEAR	AF/A2DS	
ISR.5.P3: By FY20, ensure partner nations can access necessary intelligence by increasing integration and removing unnecessary and outdated classification barriers.	NEAR	AF/A2	
FH1.1 (Near) Ensure the ability to gain and maintain the required degree of control of the air to prevent effective enemy interference with friendly operations.			
FH1.1.P4: By FY20, ensure U.S. footprint and agreements with host nations support the ability to gain and maintain the required degree of control of the air as required.	NEAR	AF/A8XX	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FH1.1.P4.a: Demonstrate vitality of partnership plans that illustrate the improved ability to flow critical resources into select forward locations through creative exercise scenarios. 	NEAR	AFMC A8/9	
FH1.4 (Mid) Enhance abilities to degrade or deny situational awareness and targeting ability to an advanced enemy.			

Table 4: SPA Objectives and Tasks Supporting International Partnerships	Time Frame	OPR(s)	Connection to other Annexes
FH1.4.P7: Increase capability to advise partner nations on multiple light-aircraft, Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD), space and cyberspace operations in order to increase global responsiveness to a crisis. (Tied to objective IN3.3.P3)	NEAR	AF/ A3OMQ OCR: AF/A2DS	
FH2.5 (Far) Ensure rapid, robust global mobility by developing and maintaining smart and adaptive global and theater distribution networks to ensure the most efficient movement and positioning of materials, and by leveraging advanced design and manufacturing.			
FH2.5.P3: Leverage available access to shared facilities with partners and allies in order to maximize use of limited infrastructure and as a way to support our combined posture efforts. Tied to objective IN3.3.P4.	NEAR	AF/A4	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FH2.5.P3.a: Preserve and pursue applicable host nation agreements in coordination with OSD that support the theater distribution network. 	NEAR	SAF/IA OCRs: AF/A4 AF/A5S	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FH2.5.P3.b: By FY20, work with allies and partners to develop a Logistics Common Operating Picture. 	NEAR	AF/A4 OCRs: SAF/IA, AFMC/ A4	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FH2.5.P3.b1: Develop the capability in Air Force security forces to work with partner nations on air base defense as a force multiplier. 	NEAR	AF/A4	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FH2.5.P3.b2: Develop low-cost unmanned systems for airbase defense and integration with host nations. 	MID	AF/A5R	S&T
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FH2.5.P3.b3 Develop the capability to assist partner nations in developing fuel infrastructure. 	NEAR	AF/A4	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FH2.5.P3.b4 Develop the capability to advise partner nations on airfield development and rapid runway repair. 	NEAR	AF/A4	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FH2.5.P3.c: By FY20, work with appropriate authorities to ensure required key Acquisition Cross Service Agreements (ACSA) with partner nations are established, especially when it expands the capacity of partner nations to conduct operations in the lower end of the conflict spectrum, where the Air Force is accepting greater risk. 	NEAR	AF/A4 OCRs: MAJCOMS, AF/JA	
MDA.2 (Near). Reappraise existing compartmentalization practices and eliminate institutional barriers to empower Airmen and organizations to employ multi-domain approaches.			
MDA.2.P2: Conduct innovative demonstrations and exercises that illustrate more dynamic and flexible global posture options that focus on the efficient use of assets and forces and expanding the multi-domain mindset while decreasing the Air Force's footprint overseas.	NEAR	ACC A3B/G OCR: AF/A9	

CONCLUSION

In the future, we anticipate challenges to responsiveness will include lack of time for planning and preparation, fluid situations, vague requirements, and ill-defined relationships. This fog and friction is often at its worst at the start of a crisis. Lessons from previous operations, drawn from after-action reports, articles, histories, studies, and interviews, suggest the future joint force must address issues such as pre-crisis global posture and strategic disposition, response force readiness, and collaborative relationships among other topics. Within this context, this Strategic Posture Annex seeks to help enable the Nation to enhance its strategic posture as we pursue a path toward improved institutional strategic agility.

In accordance with the Air Force Strategy and the SMP, this annex describes how the Air Force will:

- Focus on preparing and posturing for the most demanding scenario rather than extended stabilization operations (**Force Presentation**).
- Maintain the necessary permanent presence abroad including critical forward enablers and infrastructure in order to effectively project combat power (**Power Projection**).
- Increase emphasis on stand-off capabilities which maximize speed, range, and flexibility, while maintaining the ability to transition to effective, resilient presence in the battlespace (**Resilience**).
- Organize, train, and equip Airmen to effectively support CCDRs' security cooperation requirements (**International Partnerships**).

Our U.S. and overseas basing posture may require changes based on the evolution of partnerships, materials, and training in an increasingly changing strategic environment. The Air Force basing posture is vital since it significantly impacts our ability to respond to international crises and contingencies in accordance with the *National Military Strategy* and achieve Global Vigilance-Global Reach-Global Power for the Nation.